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The Politics of the Geneva Conventions:
A voiding Formalist Traps
ROSA BROOKS

•

It always feels good to do what you're good at, and, as Sam
Estreicher observed during an earlier session, lawyers are good at
formalism. When we talk about the Geneva Conventions, it's
particularly tempting to retreat into formalism, because emotions so
easily start running high: after all, if we leave the tidy formalist world,
we're into a messy argument about good and evil, right and wrong,
terror and torture, cruelty and necessity. Few lawyers are good at that
sort of conversation.
Nonetheless, I am not making news when I say that formalism has
limits, as well as virtues, and these limits are quite quickly reached
when the subject is the Geneva Conventions. Let me say a bit about
what those limits are-and what it would take to somehow move
beyond them.
The Geneva Conventions were drafted in 1949, in another world. The
world of the Geneva Conventions' "framers" is still familiar to all of us,
though increasingly it is familiar from movies and books rather from the
evening news or, still less, our own lived experience. The world in
which the Conventions were drafted was a world of states: powerful
states, weak states, predatory states, law-abiding states, but states all the
same. Soldiers wore uniforms designed by their states, carried weapons
issued by their states, obeyed orders given by their commanders, and
fought against the armies of other states.
Well-most of the time, anyway. It's true that even then, there were
actors and conflicts that didn't fit the mold. There were partisans who
wore no uniforms and answered to no recognized authority, and
guerillas and resistance fighters who straddled the line between civilian
and combatant. But although it is sometimes hard to make students see
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this, lawmaking is an imaginative enterprise: lawmakers look at the
existing world, project onto it an image of a better, tidier world, and
then try to develop contingency plans for dealing with various
imaginable forms of untidiness. In this sense lawmaking is inevitably
backward looking, because none of us is very good at correctly
predicting future changes.
So the diplomats who negotiated the Geneva Conventions took the
raw materials already at hand, from the Hague Conventions and from
international custom, and coupled these with their own searing sense of
what had gone wrong in the world war just ended. In a sense, the
Geneva Conventions read like an attempt to revisit the Second World
War, without the mess, confusion, cruelty, and slaughter of civilians.
This is not surprising.
Inevitably, the Geneva Conventions were "out of date" from the
moment they entered into force; they laid out rules for a world more
orderly than the world they had inherited, and hoped that by doing so,
they would encourage life to imitate art.
Up to a point, it worked. The Conventions have been normatively
important. They have led powerful states to integrate Convention rules
into their own domestic law, and they have provided an important tool
for shaming parties to conflicts into behaving better than they might
otherwise.
But the Conventions were always aspirational, and since their entry
into force, human ingenuity has devised new and different ways to fight
and kill. We now fear the terrorist's bomb, anthrax in the mail system,
sabotage of critical infrastructure, or a lethal virus released deliberately
as much as we fear an invasion by a powerful state.
The threats we face today are not necessarily "worse" than the threats
we used to face. It is important to emphasize this. There is no satisfying
way to quantify the risks we face today and compare them to the risks
we faced three or four decades ago. Yes, a "dirty bomb" in New York
could be catastrophic, potentially killing thousands and making a major
city uninhabitable. Is this "worse," though, than the Cold War risk of
nuclear war? Worse than the risk of ethnic slaughter, exemplified by the
Holocaust?
Still, the increased threat of terrorism, though perhaps not a "worse"
threat than any prior threat, is certainly a "different" threat in crucial
ways. Guerillas and terrorists have always existed, and never fit neatly
into the Geneva Conventions framework, but they operated on the
margins until globalization scattered the tools of mass destruction
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around the world. The hijacked airplane, the simple materials to make a
hundred or a million IEDs, the cell-phone detonators, the viruses in testtubes: these are new. Globalization has turned the marginal, nuisance
threat of terrorism into a threat that even powerful states must take
seriously.
Even in powerful states, intelligence services, militaries and laws all
evolved to handle "traditional" conflicts and traditional threats from
belligerent foreign states. Yet terrorists-like other non-state actorsare, by definition, not party to the Geneva Convention. They play by a
different set of rules-if indeed there is any set of rules they follow.
As a result, the formal framework of the Geneva Conventions does
not fit the struggle against terrorism well. Too many of its threshold
distinctions are premised on the continued existence of a rapidly
----~-L~.--
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The Geneva Conventions take it for granted, for instance, that we can
draw meaningful spatial distinctions between zones of conflict and
zones of peace, but this breaks down when the enemy is a
geographically diffuse terrorist network, neither confined to one state
nor interested in controlling territory. If al Qaeda has a secret cell in
Yemen--or in Germany, or in the United States-from which it plans
and trains for terrorist attacks, is Yemen (or Germany, or the United
States) in a conflict zone? The Geneva Conventions offer no way to
answer this question.
Temporal boundaries between war and peace, as well as spatial
boundaries, are challenged by the rise of non-state actors. The Geneva
Conventions assume a world in which diplomacy and negotiations can
bring an end to a conflict, but with loosely organized terrorist
organizations, there is often no one with whom one could negotiate, and
no one with the authority to bring about a peace. Attacks may be
constant, or intermittent, and the Geneva Conventions don't offer
helpful standards for determining when a conflict begins or ends in the
absence of agreements between parties to the conflict.
Most troublingly, given recent events, the Geneva Conventions don't
offer satisfying answers to the question of which people are entitled to
benefit from its protections. On the one hand, the text is clear that the
Conventions apply only to "High Contracting Parties," which, by
definition, are states. 1 On the other hand, we have Common Article 3, 2
I. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
1, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter GPW].
2. E.g., id. art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38.
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which may-or may not-be taken to apply to all parties to all conflicts
not otherwise covered, regardless of nationality and state allegiance.
And even when we're confident that the Conventions apply to a conflict
within a territory, what do we do about combatants who wear no
uniforms, or don't appear to work within a traditional military command
structure? A strict reading of the Geneva Conventions suggests that the
Bush Administration is not unjustified in its claim that neither al Qaeda
nor Taliban detainees captured in Afghanistan are entitled to prisoner of
war status.
I have written extensively about these issues elsewhere, so I won't
run through additional examples here. 3 The point is that an entirely
formalist read of the Geneva Conventions leads to the conclusion that
the Conventions just aren't applicable, for the most part, to the "war on
terror."
To human rights advocates (of whom I am one), this is an unpalatable
conclusion, for it appears to suggest that there are virtually no rules of
international law governing how the war on terror is waged. It suggests
that the United States is legally entitled to offer few or no protectionsprocedural or substantive-to those it suspects of being terrorists, and in
fact can treat suspected terrorists in a manner that would be clearly
illegal in both a domestic criminal context and in a traditional armed
conflict context.
Most rights advocates adopt one of two strategies in reaction to this
dilemma. The first strategy consists of agreeing that a formalist read of
the Geneva Conventions makes them hard to apply to terrorism, but
shrugging this off on the grounds that terrorism is not a form of armed
conflict at all, and is merely criminal activity. Obviously, if terrorism is
simply a form of crime, and not a form of armed conflict, it is subject
not to the Geneva Conventions but to domestic criminal and
constitutional law, which offer relatively robust protections for suspects.
The second strategy employed by many rights advocates consists of
what one could call "modified formalism": it consists of accepting that
terrorism is a form of armed conflict, but arguing that the Geneva
Conventions should be interpreted less like a statute than a constitution.
That is, a treaty should be interpreted according to its "spirit" and
according to the "intent" of its framers, which in this case was to protect
fundamental human rights during armed conflicts. A modified version
of this argument is that some of the substantive aspects of the Geneva
3. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004).
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Conventions are customary law, and that customary law imposes
additional obligations on detaining powers beyond those outlined in the
Conventions. Both variants of this theory can then be used to justify
demanding POW-like protections even for those detainees who most
clearly lack any entitlement to them on a strict formalist reading of the
Conventions.
Neither approach overcomes the problems I have discussed. The first
has a head-in-the-sand quality, since international terrorism is different
from ordinary crime in significant and obvious ways, and it seems clear
that traditional criminal investigations and trials are not an adequate
means of combating terrorists who seek to cause mass death and who
operate in many different countries. For the most part, serious rights
advocates have abandoned this line of argument, and acknowledged that
at least some of the time, if not all of the time, the activities of terrorisl
groups look more like armed conflict than crime.
The second approach is better, but it is also problematic. First, it
raises unresolved questions about treaty interpretation. There is no clear
legal basis for insisting that the Geneva Conventions be read according
to their "spirit" rather than their letter, and in any case it is far from
clear that the framers of the Convention would have chosen to accord
terrorists most of the rights given to POWs, had they foreseen
international terrorism of the sort we now face. There is also little
consensus about which aspects of the Geneva Conventions reflect (or
have become) binding customary international law. Certainly core
provisions, such as those that prohibit the intentional targeting of
civilians, reflect customary international law-but more subtle
questions of due process are less easily resolved by reference to custom.
This means, among other things, that Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales was not wrong when, during his days as White House
Counsel, he advised President Bush that some provisions of the Geneva
Conventions seem "quaint" or even "obsolete" when applied to
terrorists. 4
It is difficult-almost impossible-to advance this proposition
without generating enormous opposition from most rights advocates,
but I think that the opposition is knee-jerk and misplaced.
Acknowledging that the Bush Administration's read of the Geneva
Conventions is not implausible does not require agreement with the
Administration's policies. It is entirely possible to accept that the
4. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to the President (Jan. 25,
2002).
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Geneva Conventions don't apply to terrorist suspects, but still consider
the Administration's detention and interrogation policies both morally
bankrupt and strategically foolish.
The Geneva Conventions should not be sacralized. They are
important, relevant, and often useful. But if we resist Bush
Administration policies by treating the Geneva Conventions as sacred
cows, we do the long-term cause of promoting human rights a
disservice. The Conventions are not perfect-how could they be? They
are the product of a time and a place, of divisive negotiations between
human beings who sought to represent the interests of their states.
Indeed, before the "war on terror" rallied rights advocates around the
Conventions, some in the human rights community were themselves
attacking the Convention framework for its inadequacies, arguing that
the Geneva Conventions actually legitimize (and-by implication-can
worsen) the violence of states. These are important critiques, and we
need to clear enough intellectual space to have them.
The only way to do that is to stop treating the Geneva Conventions as
our sole or most crucial point of reference. To be sure, the Geneva
Conventions are the law we've got, so it is useful to ask what the
Geneva Conventions require, what they permit, and what issues they
just don't address; it's also useful to identify areas of consensus and
discord about how and when they are applicable. But if we value the
rule of law, this needs to be done in an honest and disinterested way.
This means facing up to it when the Conventions are silent or seem
archaic, and acknowledging it when the questions we face are primarily
policy questions, not legal questions.
In practice, this does not happen much. In the debate about post-9111
U.S. practices, few of the participants are willing to move beyond
formalism or faux formalism of one sort or another. As I suggested at
the beginning, perhaps this is because we find the policy discussions too
difficult and emotional. But it is dangerous to avoid them.
When we refuse to admit the limits of formalism, we inevitably have
to start stretching rules and ordinary meanings. And if rights advocates
adopt a rigid formalism, it becomes difficult to focus clearly on
important differences between various Administration arguments, which
in tum makes it hard to develop effective rejoinders.
Take three different examples.
First, consider the Bush Administration's decision to deny POW
status to Taliban detainees. As noted above, a strict formalist read of the
Geneva Conventions makes the Administration's decision seem
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perfectly plausible, though hardly inevitable. It would be possible to
argue that the Administration was just wrong, however, either on the
facts or on the law; one could argue, for instance, that most Taliban
soldiers wore distinctive emblems and otherwise met Geneva
requirements, or that at any rate some did, and therefore individualized
status hearings were required.
Second, consider the Administration's arguments relating to torture,
contained in the Bybee Memo of August 1, 2002, which concluded that
under federal law, "torture" must involve only the sort of pain
associated with organ failure and death. 5 The response here would be
that Administration lawyers were not simply mistaken about the
conclusions warranted by statute, treaty, and case law, but that they
were engaging in illegitimate and arguably unethical forms of legal
arguntentation, ignoiing and selecti\'elj' misreading various relevant

texts in order to reach a predetermined conclusion.
Third, consider the arguments, also in the Bybee memo, claiming that
the President has the inherent constitutional power to override
conflicting federal law when he deems it necessary. 6 These arguments
are legal in their form-they rely on the President's commander in chief
powers-but their implications go beyond law, insofar as they assert, in
some fundamental sense, that political power is simply beyond law's
reach.
In each of these three cases, Administration arguments are couched in
the language of formalism. Everyone wants the law on their side, so this
is understandable. But the kinds of arguments are fundamentally
different.
Think of law-of the enterprise of legal interpretation-as a game,
like basketball or tennis. The game of legal interpretation has rules,
some written, some customary, some bright-line, some ambiguous. But
although it is difficult to say just what elements make tennis tennis, we
all know that there is a difference between playing tennis in a way that
pushes the envelope between the permissible and the impermissible,
cheating, and leaving the game. Thus: calling a ball "in" when it just
touches the outside of the baseline is skirting the edge of the
permissible, but it is clearly within the rule. Calling a ball "in" when
one knows it to have landed outside the baseline is cheating, but it is
still playing tennis: it is just cheating at tennis. Pausing to beat up one's
5. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002).
6. !d.
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opponent when he objects to cheating is no longer tennis, however; the
resort to force destroys the game entirely.
Map this onto the three different Administration arguments I
mentioned above. The Bush administration claim that Taliban detainees
are not entitled to POW status or individualized hearings on the
question may be wrongheaded in a strategic or moral sense. But if we
think of law as a game, the Administration is clearly playing by the
rules here, though perhaps pushing boundaries a bit.
The claim about torture relies on cheating, insofar as it depends on
selective and misleading citation and odd logical leaps. Nonetheless,
cheating, however reprehensible, is a way to play the game; by
definition, if you are cheating at a game you are still accepting most
aspects of the game itself.
But the claim about inherent executive powers is of a different order.
Though couched in formalist terms, it's a game-ending move, the rough
equivalent of a threat: "Play by my rules or I'll crush you."
Although law is "gamelike" in many respects, it is, of course,
crucially different from tennis. The "rules" of law and legal
interpretation are not there for the entertainment of the players; they're
not merely self-referential. Law is supposed to bear some relation to
facts on the ground, and law enables coercive action to be taken in ways
that alter the facts on the ground. If we create a legal system in which
cheating is widespread--or, worse, if we overlook game-ending moves
and treat them as legitimate modifications of the game-then it isn't
merely rules that get bent, but the rule of law altogether.
This is what makes it so important to move beyond the sacralization
of the Geneva Conventions to a more particularized discussion of just
what morality and strategy require. As long as we insist that the Geneva
Conventions and related law and custom set the terms of the debate
about post-9/11 U.S. actions, we create strong incentives for players to
push the envelope, cheat, and even go outside the law altogether in one
way or another. This dangerously weakens the rule of law.
The Geneva Conventions-what they permit, what they require, and
what they do not reach-should thus be the beginning of the discussion,
not the end. If we're serious about both rights and security, we should
make an effort to get back to basics: what sort of world do we want to
live in? Knowing that terrorism will persist, and that technological
development will continue to give tools of mass destruction to non-state
actors, what principles ought to govern how terrorist suspects are
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treated, and how states respond to real or perceived threats from
terrorists?
This requires thinking both about morality and about strategy. And
the process, if taken seriously, might help break through impasses and
allow us to identify areas of agreement that are obscured when the
Geneva Conventions dictate the terms of debate.
Imagine, for instance, that we live in the "all security, all the time"
world, in which collective physical security always outweighs
individual rights. There is no free expression, no freedom of movement,
no right to due process. None of us would want to inhabit so totalitarian
a state-and most of us would wonder, in any case, if "perfect" security
is even a realistic goal. We do not strive for "perfect" road safety,
because we value convenience, speed, and a relatively low level of state
monitoring, and because '.Ve probably could not achieve perfect safety in
any case. Security from terrorist threats is not inherently different; at
some point one realizes diminishing returns on further rights
restrictions.
Of course, few of us would want to inhabit an "all rights, all the time"
state either, one in which state authorities entirely lacked the power to
adapt law and policy to meet new kinds of threats if doing so meant
longer detentions or more limited due process rights.
Imagining an "all security, all the time" world versus an "all rights,
all the time" world helps get us past the tendency to assume that
security must trump rights or rights must trump security, and recasts the
questions as one about precisely which tradeoffs are worthwhile. But
even this is still a bit misleading, since conceptualizing the debate in
terms of a tradeoff between rights and security obscures the
possibility-indeed, the strong likelihood-that "security" and "rights"
are causally linked.
That is: it is quite possible that some rights-restricting U.S. actions in
the war on terror have actually increased the terrorist threat against the
United States. Our policy of open-ended detentions at Guantanamo, for
instance, justified by the Bush Administration on security grounds, has
alienated even many of our allies. Accept, for the sake of the argument,
that at least most, if not all, of the Guantanamo detainees are dangerous
terrorists who, if released, will continue their efforts to attack the United
States in some way. A level-headed policy maker needs to take this
prospect seriously, and critics of Guantanamo Bay should not assume
that all detainees are innocent or harmless. But a level-headed policy
maker should also take into account the externalities of Guantanamo.
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These are difficult to measure, but might include some or all of the
following: greater difficulties in persuading "friendly" states to share
intelligence information, greater difficulties in persuading ordinary
people in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to trust U.S. forces and share
information; and greater difficulty discouraging some from actively
supporting al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. organizations.
All these externalities create new security risks that must be
evaluated alongside the risks of releasing potentially dangerous
terrorists. Note, too, that the "moral" and "strategic" arguments prove to
be intertwined. Regardless of how U.S. policy makers view the morality
of open-ended detentions, they may have serious costs to the United
States as long as many others view them as immoral.
Of course, one can, and should, turn this around as well. High levels
of physical insecurity make the enjoyment of other human rights
difficult or impossible, and terrorism is itself a human rights violation of
enormous magnitude. If a rigid insistence on procedural due process
rights for terror suspects led to a massive increase in catastrophic
terrorist attacks, we would not be better off. The often-repeated claim
that it is our very openness that makes us vulnerable is not entirely
frivolous.
All this implies, I think, that we need to evaluate the various kinds of
threats and potential responses with some specificity. Certain
restrictions on rights-limited in duration-might well be justifiable in
the face of an imminent catastrophic threat (nuclear weapons, for
instance). But the phrase "the war on terrorism" lumps together, by
implication, a wide range of different threats, most of which would not
justify serious restrictions on rights. The captured Taliban soldier, for
instance, however resolutely anti-American, will probably do the United
States no great harm if released-even if he promptly rejoins the
Taliban. Osama bin Laden, if captured, would present a different story.
Similarly, if we are concerned about biological attacks on the United
States, it may be that massive investments in our dysfunctional public
health system are a more effective response to this threat than
weakening norms against torture through the use of various "coercive"
interrogation techniques.
It's beyond the scope of this short essay to discuss concrete means of
dealing with the variety of security threats we now face. My point is that
we need to walk back from the panicky, post-9111 sense that anything
goes in the name of fighting terrorism. We need to develop responses to
terrorism that are nuanced and proportionate, and acknowledge both that
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the varying forms of terrorism do not pose equal threats and that every
response has costs of its own.
That will be a monumental undertaking, but not a hopeless
undertaking. The work of several of the participants in this conference
makes valuable contributions to the project I have outlined. To some
extent, we're facing empirical questions: how severe are the various
threats, and what can be done about each? Lawyers may be good at
formalism, but increasingly, many of us are also good at making costbenefit analyses, and a bit more of this would be useful here. So too
would be looking to the experience of other nations that have addressed
terrorist threats through domestic legislation. While other nations have
at times restricted certain rights to combat terrorism, none have found it
necessary to tum to torture or indefinite detention. It seems likely that
we could learn from a careful study of the effectiveness of different
domestic legal regimes.
Paul Stephan opened this conference by asking, "Who owns the
Geneva Conventions? Who gets to say what is in them, and should be in
them?" My answer, on some level, is: why not us? Why not begin the
process of imaging a new law of armed conflict, and new domestic
laws, right here and right now?
It's easy to respond that this is too hard, and will take too long, and
opens up too many cans of worms. But this is a cop-out. It may be a
hard, long, and divisive process, but we certainly won't be able to
develop a new consensus if we don't try.

